CHRISTINE KORSGAARD SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY PDF

We are social animals, so probably the whole thing has a biological basis. Or at least, when we invoke them, we make claims on one another. The same is true of the other concepts for which we seek philosophical foundations. Concepts like knowledge, beauty, and meaning, as well as virtue and justice, all have a normative dimension, for they tell us what to think, what to like, what to say, what to do, and what to be. And it is the force of these normative claims — the right of these concepts to give laws to us — that we want to understand. Why should I be moral?

Author:JoJozahn Dailar
Country:Thailand
Language:English (Spanish)
Genre:Marketing
Published (Last):15 July 2013
Pages:45
PDF File Size:3.44 Mb
ePub File Size:14.95 Mb
ISBN:132-8-94559-132-5
Downloads:44498
Price:Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]
Uploader:Groshura



We are social animals, so probably the whole thing has a biological basis. Or at least, when we invoke them, we make claims on one another. The same is true of the other concepts for which we seek philosophical foundations. Concepts like knowledge, beauty, and meaning, as well as virtue and justice, all have a normative dimension, for they tell us what to think, what to like, what to say, what to do, and what to be.

And it is the force of these normative claims — the right of these concepts to give laws to us — that we want to understand. Why should I be moral? This is not, as H. Pritchard supposed, a misguided request for a demonstration that morality is in our interest although that may be one answer to the question.

It is a call for philosophy, the examination of life. Korsgaard does not reject these accounts, but concludes that they are all true: 1. A good legislator commands us to do only what is in any case a good idea to do, but the bare fact that an action is a good idea cannot make it a requirement. For that, it must be made law by someone in a position to command us.

As we saw, that view is true. What it describes is the relation in which we stand to ourselves. The fact that we must act in the light of reflection gives us a double nature.

The thinking self has the power to command the acting self, and it is only its command that can make action obligatory. A good thinking self commands the acting self only to do what is good, but the acting self must in any case do what it says. This view is also true.

What it describes is the activity of the thinking self as it assesses the impulses that present themselves to us, the legislative proposals of our nature. That is to say, the necessity of acting in the light of reflection makes us authorities over ourselves. And in so far as we have authority over ourselves, we can make laws for ourselves, and those laws will be normative. Autonomy is the source of obligation. That is, in the Aristotelian sense, our human form.

HAEMATOKRIT 210 PDF

Christine Korsgaard

Christine Korsgaard is a Kantian moral philosopher who works on the problem of value. She wants not only to explain the moral obligations we have to one another, but also justify those obligations. In her book The Sources of Normativity, Korsgaard surveys four proposals, starting with Thomas Hobbes , who in the seventeenth century found the source of obligation in the legislative authority of a monarch, who implements divine commands with "irresistible power. Korsgaard says that in the early twentieth century this view was held by G. Moore and recently by Thomas Nagel.

1N400X DATASHEET PDF

KORSGAARD SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY PDF

.

BROWN LEMAY Y BURSTEN QUIMICA LA CIENCIA CENTRAL PDF

Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity

.

Related Articles